Can I efficiently remove dominated actions in imperfect-information games?
Dominated Actions in Imperfect-Information Games
This paper explores "dominated actions" in imperfect-information games, a concept from game theory. Dominated actions are choices within a game that are always worse than alternative choices, regardless of what other players do. The paper presents a polynomial-time algorithm to identify and remove these actions, effectively simplifying the game. This is particularly relevant to extensive-form games (sequential decision-making), where converting to normal form (simultaneous actions) for analysis is computationally expensive. Experiments in two-player poker illustrate how this technique can significantly reduce the game's complexity.
For LLM-based multi-agent systems, this research is relevant for optimizing agent decision-making. Identifying and eliminating dominated actions could simplify the action space LLMs need to consider, potentially leading to faster and more efficient reasoning, especially in complex, multi-agent interactions with sequential actions like negotiations or strategic planning. This could improve performance in scenarios where agents need to respond quickly or when computational resources are limited.