Can coalitions manipulate knockout tournaments adaptively?
Adaptive Manipulation for Coalitions in Knockout Tournaments
December 17, 2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.11799This paper explores how a group of cooperating players (a coalition) can manipulate a knockout tournament to make their chosen player win. It introduces the concept of adaptive manipulation, where coalition members decide which matches to intentionally lose based on who advances in each round, using the most up-to-date information.
Key points relevant to LLM-based multi-agent systems:
- Adaptive strategies: The paper highlights the importance of adaptive strategies in multi-agent systems, where agents adjust their behavior based on real-time observations. This relates to how LLMs in multi-agent scenarios could adjust responses based on evolving interactions.
- Complexity of coordination: The paper demonstrates the computational complexity of coordinating actions even in a simplified tournament setting. This highlights the challenges of designing efficient coordination mechanisms for LLM-based multi-agent systems.
- Game theory: The manipulation strategies considered are essentially game-theoretic in nature, involving players optimizing their actions to achieve a desired outcome. This emphasizes the relevance of game theory concepts in designing and analyzing LLM-based multi-agent interactions.
- Best-response calculation: The "best-response" problem introduced, where agents calculate the optimal action for the current round, connects to how LLMs could be used to determine the best next response in multi-agent conversations or tasks.