Can LLM agents protect against timing attacks?
Eavesdropping on Semantic Communication: Timing Attacks and Countermeasures
November 12, 2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.07088This paper explores a security vulnerability in semantic communication, where an eavesdropper (Eve) can infer information about a remote process by observing the timing of communication between two agents (Alice and Bob), even if the message content is encrypted. Specifically, if Bob uses semantic communication to efficiently schedule requests to Alice based on the likely state of the remote process, this timing information leaks details about the process to Eve.
Key points for LLM-based multi-agent systems:
- Timing side-channel attacks: The core idea is that when LLMs communicate can reveal information, even if what they communicate is hidden. This is crucial for secure multi-agent systems where communication patterns might expose sensitive data.
- Balance between efficiency and security: Semantic communication (adapting communication based on predicted information needs, similar to how LLMs might optimize dialogue) offers efficiency but creates vulnerabilities. Developers must balance optimized communication with security considerations.
- Defense strategies: The paper proposes a "Semantic Hysteresis Alternating Defense from Eavesdropping (SHADE)" algorithm. This suggests that developers can create dynamic strategies that switch between efficient (but leaky) and secure (but less efficient) communication patterns based on real-time risk assessment. This has implications for designing robust LLM agent communication protocols.
- Game theoretic framing: The interaction between Bob and Eve is modeled as a game, implying that building secure multi-agent LLM systems requires anticipating adversarial behaviors and developing strategic communication protocols.